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TOWARll3 A OORABLE PEACE

•
II.

Europe and United States Policies

Mr. President:
A short time ago I discussed with the Senate what I regard as
some of the principal points of potential conflict in the world .

I

suggested that, despite any appearances to the contrary, pressures
exist in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East which, i f unrelieved,
could precipitate war .
If we wish to act, to act for peace it will do no good to
ignore these situations .

It will do no good to propagandize ourselves

into the belief that the tensions which they contain will be forever
held in check.

The fuses are set and any one of them, at any time,

can be ignited by accident or by design and blast this misleading
illusion in our faces .
If there is to be a firmer base for peace in Europe, the Middle
East and the Far East, it seems to me essential that we see these regions
as they are, not as they were yesterday or as we might like them to
be, but as they are now. It is necessary to determine whether any
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changes can be made in our policies which may serve to reduce the danger
of conflict in one or more of these regions.

I may add that it is equally

necessary that the Russians and the nations of the regions themselves do
the same.
To those who say that the Russians will not act for peace
in these dangerous situations, I must point out that if they do not do
so, then by some perversion of reason, they have concluded that their
interest lies in their extinction along with the general destruction
of bum;m society.

For, it is that, rather than Soviet aggrandisement

or American gain which is the promise of the failure to act for peace
in these situatinas.

Against madness, i f such it is that governs the

Soviet Union, there is no safeguard except alertness and defense and
it goes without saying that we must maintain both.
To those who say, however, that the attitude of the Soviet
Union is the sole factor underlying the tensions at the pressurepoints of Europe, the Middle East and the Far East I can only point
out that history and a modicum of reflection tells us that that is a
deceptive oversimplification.

It is almost as wrong as the Soviet

- 3 view which it parallels, the view which holds us solely responsible
these tensions.

It completely ignores the inner

the Middle East and the Far East,
~rom

d~ficulties

di~~iculties

~or

of Europe,

which exist quite apart

the Soviet Union and ourselves.
I must point out, further, that this nation's greatness

was not built by reacting to what others do or fail to do but in doing
what we ourselves hold that it is right to do.
right - and I know
we must, in good

o~

no member

~aith,

work

o~

~or

If we believe peace is

this body who professes otherwise - then

peace.

We must work

prudently, and cautiously but we must work

~or

it.

~or

it wisely,

We wst work for

it not only as an abstract ideal but as a practical and compelling
necessity.

We must work

~or

it, not as a concession to the Russians

but as a duty to ourselves and to mankind.
It is within

~his

basic approach, Mr. President, that I shall

consider, today, the situation in Europe as one
points

o~

potential

con~lict

in the world.

Senate that I list Europe in this

~ashion.

o~

the major pressure-

It may seem strange to the
Certainly,

i~

there is any

~

- 4 on the globe where American policies over the years have been helpful
in building a relatively high degree of stability for freedom, it is
Europe.

Certainly, Western Europe has come a long way from the depths

of hopelessness and helplessness to which it had sunk bythe end of World
War II.

Certainly, we have been reassured that the recent NATO Con-

ference of Ministers in Copenhagen attests to the vitality of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Certainly, Western Germany has reached

new heights of achievement in peace and in freedom.

Certainly Soviet

totalitarianism is having its troubles in Eastern Europe.
That is all to the good, Mr. President.
not the whole picture.

Unfortunately, it is

There is another aspect of the European situation

which does not come so readily or pleasantly into view.

Nevertheless,

it exists and it constitutes a threat to Europe's peace and, hence,
to our peace and to the peace of the world.
This other aspect, this darker side, of the European situation,
Mr. President, is composed primarily of three problems:

the uncertainty

as to the permanence of European integration and NATO cooperation; the
delayed unification of Germany; and the unfinished business of a transition
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Until

patterns are firmly established through which these problems can be
solved, patterns which promise reasonable stability and reasonable opportunity
for freedom to survive and to grow, it is premature to conclude that
Europe is on the road to lasting peace.
It is erroneous to conclude, too, that either the Soviet Union or
the United States or the United states and the Soviet Union together constitute the sole cause of the difficulty.

Yet, that is the type of

the conclusion which, today, is being widely drawn, respectively, in
this country, in Russia and in Europe.
Of these inner problems of Europe, Mr . President, that of the
integration of Western Europe within the larger cooperation of the
NATO grouping is the nost advanced towards solution .

The Europeans

themselves have moved a long way towards unity in the Coal and Steel
Comnrunity, in Euratom, in the Comm:m Market and in other IID.ltual undertakings.

They have built a great complex of integrating mechanisms in

the past decade, a constructive political achievement which rivals any

- 6 other in European history.

Further, NATO for all its shortcomings, still

maintains around the core of a uniting Western Europe, the basic machinery
for the defense of a still-wider arc of free nations.
But this integrating process, Mr. President, however successful it bas been to date, is not yet a fully established, self-sustaining
one.

It cannot stand still in a world which does not stand still.

The

process must either go on to new heights of common progress and greater
security for the participating nations or it will falter and sink back.
We may well ask, sink back to what?

To the national rivalries of

Europe preceding the two great Wars and the isolation of one free
nation from another?

To the attempt to achieve security for one's own

state while others are insecure?

Free nations have tried that formula

before and they have paid and are continuing to pay an enormous price
for the folly.
The truth is that there is no road back to a past.

The only

retreat is a retreat to disaster, for ourselves and forother free nations.
What disturbs me, however, is a tendency in this country and in others
to believe that since such is the case, the nations of the West will
not succumb to the temptations of retreat.

Unfortunately, Mr. President,

- 7 nations in panic, in anger or in desperation have been known many times
to abandon their long-range welfareJ and it is a highly dangerous assumption

to hold that they will not do so again.
I do not believe that the concepts of European integration and
Western cooperation - for all the progress of the past decade - have yet
passed the point of no return .

The pursuit of these concepts may well

be approaching a crisis at this very time, a crisis brought on largely
by the cunrul.ative attrition of the issues of Cyprus and North Africa,
the impact of the Soviet peace-offensive on the peoples of Western
Europe and the still-unmeasured impact of the recession at home on
ourselves and all free nations.
If the integration of Europe and the cooperation of free
Western nations - this effort to which nany nations have given so Illl.lch if it is vital to us and to others, then it is incumbent upon others
and upon us to leave no stone unturned in seeking to assure its continuance.
I realize, of course, that in some respects, the problems of Western

- 8 cooperation are such that the policies of this country can have, at best,
only a peripheral influence.
That is certainly the case with respect to Cyprus and North
Africa.

This country has offered Good Offices in the Cyprus issue and

the able deputy undersecretary of State

[Mr.

Murphif has made a distinguished

attempt at reconciliation between France and Tunisia, an essential step
in the solution of North African crisis.
successful.

Both attempts have been un-

With these n:easures, however, surely we have not exhausted

the possibilities of policyo
I presume that at present we are continuing at every appropriate
opportunity to remind the disputants in Cyprus and to remind France with
respect to North Africa of the desperate need of all the free Western
nations for a peaceful solution to these problems.

Perhaps, Mr. President,

the time has come to go beyond mere reminders of the obvious.

Perhaps

the time has come to urge Greece, Turkey and Britain to seek an interim
I
i
...
I
f 4t. lHI \.

Gt

solution in Cyprus along the lines of a

condo~nion

J

of all three over

the island and to assist them, if they wish, in finding this solution.
I am aware that many avenues have been explored in an effort to settle

- 9 the Cypriot dispute but I am not aware that that of condominion has been
seriously considered.

Nevertheless, an interim status of that kind could

assure the continued security of the defense facilities of that strategic
islan~

at least during the present critical tine.

It could also provide

an opportunity to work out a permanent solution to the problem of ultimate
sovereignty in an atmosphere of greater stability and shared responsibility.
Certainly, it is not presumptuous on our part, as an ally to allies, to
put forward this proposal in their interest, in our interest and in the
interest of all the NATO nembers •
Perhaps, Mr. President, it is also time to state frankly to the
French that whenever they apply in full the principles of liberty,
equality and fraternity which they did so much to give to the world,
when they apply these principles to all of the peoples of North Africa,
we stand with them and until that tine, in all honesty, we cannot.
Perhaps, it is time to state to the French that i f they m:>ve
towards a solution in North Africa similar to that devised between the
United states and Puerto Rico, towards the commonwealth concept, then
we are prepared to join with other NATO members in assisting in

~hat
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inevitably will be a difficult transition.

Lest we be accused of moral

prattle or even of more sinister behavior, however, I must stress that
it is for the French to take the initiative, to indicate to us how, if
at all, we may support their efforts in this situation.
As I have said, Mr. President, there is a severe limit on
what the policies of this country can do in the Cypriot and North African
questions.

The power and the responsibility of decision lie primarily

and properly, elsewhere.

We cannot act on our own to remove these

dangers and I fully appreciate the difficulties of the Secretary of
State in trying to deal with them.
That is not the case, however, insofar, as other jeopardies
to Western cooperation are concerned.

I refer, first, to the impact

of the Soviet peace offensive on the peoples of Western Europe.
think of this offensive as astute and unscrupulous propaganda.
people, however, who

know~ first-han~war's

We may
Among

most agonizing personal tragedies,

among people weary of war and the constant threat of war, it is, to say
the least, powerful and highly effective propaganda.

It creates an

extremely difficult dilemma for all responsible European politias.l

- ll leaders who see through the propaganda and who are attempting to align
their nation's policies with those of the United States.
The answer to this Soviet propaganda, astute and unscrupulous
as it may be, is not to seek to enn1late it or outdo it .

We may, possibly,

win verbal battles with the Russians by out-shouting or by
them.

II

r.a.;:;j

out-~1

We will in the process, however, lose something nn1ch m::>re im-

portant - the nation ' s integrity.

And we will not win eonething

that is far m::>re important than these hollow victories of propaganda.
We will not win and hold the hearts and confidence of the peoples of
the world.

We had that confidence twice, at the end of World War I

and World War II and twice we have allowed it to slip away.

We can

regain it now, not by better propaganda but by better policies; not
by words of peace but by acts of peace.
Let me try, Mr . President, to illustrate this point as it
involves Western Europe.

It is important for the defense of the free

western nations that the NATO military command evolve in an orderly
fashion to keep pace with evolving military technology.

To that end,

Mr. President, we took the initiative a few months ago and obtained

I'
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a limited concurrence from other NATO members on the placement of missile
bases in European countries.

More recently, an Administration bill was

placed before Congress which permits the transfer of information on
nuclear weapons and components of the weapons to certain NATO nations.

Mr. President, I

~in

no position at this time to comment

on the military necessity or wisdom which prompted these moves.

Granted

their military importance, however, I must ask what kind of an answer
are they to the Soviet peace offensive?

How do they look to ordinary

people in Europe who like ourselves, have little knowledge of the needs
of modern military operations?
answer at all.

Standing alone, I submit, they are no

Yet so far as I know they are the only new significant

acts of policy directly affecting Europe and NATO which have been
initiated by this country since the Soviet peace offensive began.
Where was the initiative which might have demonstrated that
if the cooperation of free men means to us a willingness to die together with others in the common defense of freedom, it also means to
us a willingness to live together and to work together with others in
common constructive effort?

There were measures - companion measures

- 13 to those involving missiles' placement abroad and nuclear weapons transfers which might have been taken to make this point clear.

There are measures

which can still be taken to make it clear - in our interest and in the
interest of the Europeans.
We will not regain the confidence and the support of the
peoples of Western Europe merely by proposing to supply •

their military

comnnnds wit-h I'arts and information on how to put together a nuclear
weapon and how to use it - a do-it-yourself kit for destruction.

Let us

do that, if we must, for the common defense of freedom, but let us not,
in all common sense, expect that act, in itself, to fill the longing
for constructive action for peace which fills the hearts of ordinary
Europeans, ordinary people everywhere.
/!•

begun to

The action which might have

~

~

that longing, the action which was not taken, would have

been a concurrent proposal to dig deeper channels of cooperation between ourselves and other western European nations in the development
of peaceful nuclear energy and in the exploration of space, these two
great scientific achievements of mankind.
Such clumsy official gestures which have so far been made in
this connec ti on suggest that when it comes to supplying military missiles

- 14 and nuclear weapons to the Europeans we regard them as close and essential
allies but when it is a question of cooperation for peaceful progress,
either we regard them as dangerous competitors or, in any event, take
no notice of what they have contributed and can contribute in these fields.
I cannot see, Mr. President, what is keeping this Administration
even now from an active policy of cooperation with Euratom in the more
rapid development of the peaceful uses of nuclear power.

I cannot see

what is keeping this Administration from a policy of cooperation with
Western Europe in meeting one of the great constructive tasks of this
century -

tr~

exploration of space.

I cannot see what the block is,

Mr. President, unless it is that the Administration may regard as
futile an effort to cooperate with Europe on problems of this kind
when it cannot even get cooperation among the interested civilian and
military agencies within the Executive Branch of the government.

Mr. President, the development of nuclear power and the
exploration of space require scientific brains, technical skills and
organization, and money.

Needless to say, we do not have unlimited

resources in any of the categories.

Each Western European country alone

- 15 does not have an adequate supply of these resources.

It seems to re desir-

able, therefore, beyond all possible doubt, for our own sake as well
as for theirs, to work together in the closest possible way with them
on these matters.

More important, a common focus on these matters cannot

help but stimulate the process of European integration and '\olestern
cooperation in all of its ramifications.

Most important, an American

initiative in these matters will be an act, a positive act of peace.
Finally, Mr. President, in this discussion of the threats to
Western cooperation - to this keystone of peace in Europe - let me mention
the possible adverse impact of the recession here at home.

The present

period in Europe, is one of intense but uncertain economic activitiy.
To Europe, this period has all the earmarks of prosperity, perhaps the
greatest Europeans have ever

kno~but

it is a brittle prosperity.

In the present complex of international trade relations, it is
the United States which is the key to a high level of economic activity
in Western Europe.

The impact of the present recession which is

already having serious consequences at home, cannot be contained within

our borders.

If the recession is prolonged, the consequences abroad

- 16 may well be disastrous, not only in an economic sense but in the political
sphere as well.
That is because prosperity in Europe is a thin crust built on
economies which have little, if any nargin of reserve.

Should the

crust give way finally - and there are already signs of cracking - it
may well destroy the stability of free political institutions in Western
Europe and

undermi~he

cooperation of the countries of that region

one with another, as well as their cooperation

~

wit~the

larger framework

of NATO.
Nothing could be more disastrous to peace and to freedom.

I

refer those who doubt this assertion to the sorry history of Europe
between the wars, to the intimate relationship between economic stagnation, economic nationalism, the rise of dictatorships, and the gathering
clouds of war in that period.
In

1954, Mr. President, on returning from Europe, I suggested

in a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations that
"an immediate need would seem to be for the Western
nations to give serious consideration to convening one
or more special economic conferences. Such conferences

- 17 might serve to define the problems which Im.lSt be overcore i f the nations of Western Europe and the North
Atlantic Community are to maintain sound economies.
They could also point the way to common action in meeting these problems ••• "
In 1955, on returning from Europe, I alluded to this matter
again in these terms:
"the need for a facing of economic facts in the
Western Community is essential. This should come
in an open and frank conference and it should come
before the shortsighted 'each one for himself'
practices of the prewar period once again threaten
the free nations with a repetition of the economic
disaster of the thirties."
Mr. President, I made these observations at a time when we

were booming along in a booming prosperity, as was m:>st of Europe.

I

made them because it seemed to me that a rational solution to problems
is more likely to be obtained by acting, not after, but before the
stage of crisis is reached.
So far as I know, these observations, made several years ago,
were ignored by the Administration.

In any event, we have not had the

conferences which might have provided the kind of understanding of the
international ramifications of present economic difficulties which we
now need, the kind of understanding which would have facilitated a
more rational consideration of our trade and other international

- 18 economic policies.

Now, when we are in an economic crisis at home,

Congress is presented with the urgent pressures of the Administration
to push through a Reciprocal Trade Act and Foreign Aid Bill.

It is the

same old story, Mr. President, the story of drift and delay until deadline, crisis action in preference to rational action.
To conclude this discussion of the threat of disunity among
the Western nations, this threat to peace in Europe, let me reiterate
what I said in 1955, for it is, I believe, even more applicable today,
"If we continue to ignore the comm:m responsibilities
for building a genuine peace and preserving freedom
then we should not be shocked when we awake one day
to find both in jeopardy."
I turn now, Mr. President, to the second major problem of
peace in Europe, to the problem of a divided Germany.

It seems to me

that there is one kind of settlement of this problem which is no
settlement at all.

That is a settlement which would open the way

to a unified Germany, whether it be communist-oriented or capitalist
oriented, to become once again the military scourge of all Europe, east
and west alike.

The best, perhaps the only way, to guard against the
-.4-:\.

•

possibility of a revival of militarism in Germany is the path chosen by

"

a
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against militarism was greatest.

That is the path of peaceful fusion

with Western Europe.
Germany is of the west and must remain in the west.

Any

peace which requires a severance of those ties would be no peace at
all.

It would not even be appeasement.

It would be an act of unmitigated

folly, for Germany, for Russia and for vlestern Europe.
in any

sett~~ment

On that point,

of the problem of unification, there can be no yield-

ing.
Within that fra.nework, however, there can be room for negotiation.

While Germany's ties with Western Europe must remin intimte

and unbroken I cannot see, for example, that the present form and the
extent of Germany military participation in the defense of the West
{)

need be regarded as sacrasanct.

Security needs are ever-changing

needs and West German rearll8ment is not an end in itself.

It is for

the purpose of contributing to the defense of the Western community
and not for the purpose of frightening Europe or keeping tidy, rigid
military tables of organization.
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problem, therefore, in which it seems to me that reasonable proposals for
negotiation ought never to be rejected out of hand.

On the contrary,

they might even be advanced by the Western nations.

Present policies

on German rearmament ought to be regarded as amenable to change, provided
always, that the changes do not envision a Germany separated from Western
Europe, provided that they are carefully related with the problem of
general international disarmament.
There is another aspect to the problem of German unification,

Mr. President, which seems to me to require elaboration in the light of
the changing situation in Europe.

Our positionl Mr. President, is that

the way to peaceful unity in Germany is through free all-German elections
und.er the general sanction of Russia, France, Britain, and
the United States.

This position requires that virtually all the initia-

tive for unification, in effect, come from outside Germany.
Events, Mr. President, have moved a long way since this policy
was devised and the bell no longer has an altogether realistic sound
when it is rung over and over again in the same fashion.
has emerged in the West since that policy was devised.

A new Germany
It has grown
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into the nnst dynamic nation of Western Europe.

A new Germany has

appeared in the East and, whatever we may think of it, it is not the
same as the Germany of the past or the Germany of the West.
There are now military and para-military forces in both West
and East Germany.

How are these forces to be integrated in peace in

a unified Germany?

Is this a problem which can be solved primarily

by outside JOwers, even with the best of intentions?

Can free elections,

without advanced and extensive preparations by Germans themselves
solve it?
There are differing economic structures functioning in Western
and Eastern Germany.
outsiders?

Can these structures be harnnnized in peace by

Will free elections without advanced and extensive prepara-

tion by Germans themselves harnnnize them?
I raise these questions, Mr. President, as examples of the
inescapable realties of the present situation in Germany.

There are

countless others of a similar nature which might be cited.

It seems

to me that in the light of these realties we do not begin to have the
basis for German unification in peace and for peace, without a vast
enlargement of contact between the peoples of Western and Eastern
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Germany themselves.
Further, Mr. President, it seems to me n:ost desirable, that,
before we try to deal with the massive problems of unification of Germany
as a whole, that this problem be tested in microcosm.

What better place

is there to develop valid techniques for the process of uniting Germany
than in Berlin?

Certainly, if unification in peace and fpr peace cannot

be obtained promptly in Berlin, to which all Germans undoubtedly look as
the Capital of a unified nation, there is small prospect that it will
be obtained in peace and for peace, for the whole of Germany for a
long time to come.
I wish finally, Mr. President, in these remarks today, to
deal with the volcanic situation in Eastern Europe;., with the third major
threat to the peace of Europe.

The Russians may say that the book is

closed on this region, but they know better.
history.

They are not ignorant of

They know that so long as the principal national groupings of

Eastern Europe do not have a reasonably secure, independent national
existence, so long as these people lack reasonable internal freedom
and the right to live in full association with other nations of the

- 23 the world - so long as these basic rights are denied them, the book will
on
not be closed/Eastern Europe.
It matters only in degree how these rights are denied, whether
it is by direct Soviet or some other alien suppression or by indigenous
tyrants who fear the wrath of their own peoples.
there and it will not go away.

The instability is

As long as it finds no peaceful outlet

in progress towards establishing a secure national independence and
responsible political institutions, this insecurity will threaten the
peace of Europe and the peace of the world .
it is an old situation in new dress.
Have the Russians?

The situation is not new;

Have we forgotten 1914 and Sarajevo?

Have we forgotten 1939 and Poland?

Have the Russians?

The circumstances of World War II, Mr. President, projected
the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe.

There can be little quarrel,

Mr. President, with how the Russians entered Eastern Europe. ) 'J.)Aep:P'I

will remember that we were delighted to have them there at that time.
The quarrel is not so nruch with that as it is with what they have done

Jv

or failed to so since they have been there.

They have not yet met the

- 24 responsibility which was primarily theirs to

mee~to

encourage the

-#> ........~
emergence from the ruins

of Nazi conquest and

domination~the

"' j;t

emergence

of free and stable states and equitable societies in Eastern Europe.
Nor can there be much quarrel with any legitimate desire of
the Russians to make secure their border with Eastern Europe from whence
they were invaded in World war II.

The quarrel, Mr. President, is with

the nanner in which they have gone about it, by the discouraging of
national independence and stable and responsible internal political
orders in the Jatter region.

If legitimate security is really a

major concern of the Russians in Eastern Europe, I can only regret the
fact that they are doing precisely what, in the long run, will jeopardize
it.
The ultimate objective of American policy respecting Eastern
Europe is, and must remain, the establishment of full national independence
of the major national groupings of that region and the encouragement of
stable and responsible political institutions within them.

(

May I say,

- 25 Mr. President, that as we seek this objective for peace, then it is

essential not to seekit out of a negative desire to embarrass the
Russians or to jeopardize their security.

We must seek this objective

for positive purposes, for peace, for their peace as well as the peace
of Europe and our own.
We can look for progress towards this objective via the route
~

of the Hungarian bloodbath and then pour out tears of regret, and pour
A

millions of words into the propaganda war, but back away from painful
military involvenent when revolution is thwarted.

That is an easy and

painless '\fay, except for the thousands of martyrs whose blood is shed,
and except that there is no reason to believe that it will produce
results.

Unless, Mr. President, we are prepared to mix our own blood

with that which will flow in Eastern Europe via this route, it seems
to me that basic human decency requires that we seek some other way.
I do not know whether in present circumstances there is
another way to independence and to stable responsible governnent in
Eastern Europe.

If any does in fact exist, it seems to ne that there is

- 26 a chance that it be found eventually in the course which this Administration is now pursuing in Poland.

It is the way, noti"he cold war, but the

•

way of gradually reopening the channels of peaceful contact between the
West and the peoples of Eastern Europe.
If it is valid to maintain diplomatic relations with Russia,
Poland andHungary and other countries of Eastern Europe, as presumably it
is since we are doing so, then I cannot see the logic in not maintaining
such relations with all these states of Eastern Europe.

If it is desirable

to expand culture, trade, and other contacts between the Soviet Union
and this country, as the President has said that it is, then equally
or rore so, it would seem desirable to expand these contacts with
Poland, czechoslovakia and all the countries of Eastern Europe.
No one can say with certainty whether this policy will work.
One can only ask, what is the alternative?
It is possible that a beginning of the peaceful evolution of
Eastern Europe towards genuine national independence and responsible
government may lie, not in turning our backs on the peoples of that
region, not by the lusty verbal attacks in the propaganda war, but by

- 27 -

opening up more windows through which Western concepts may resume their
peaceful flow into Eastern Europe.

It is possible that visits by the

~ ~t•'J. f1

~ Secretary of State and other officials of this government to Eastern
Europe may assist in this process.

Such visits might provide oore

convincing evidence than verbal charges and retreats that we have not
forgotten the peoples of that region.
Finally, I believe it is in order to suggest to the Russians
that in the pursuit of their pronounced desire for peaceful coexistence
and peaceful competition they join with us in an effort to :persuade the
governments of the Eastern European countries to provide som opportunity
for the practice of western concepts of political freedom within their
borders.

I do not say that freedom, if it is to have a chance, requires

as much opportunity to compete as communism enjoys in Western Europe,
but it does require some opportunity.

Unless it has that opportunity,

~

we can hardly begin to talk of bon1.fide competition between the two
systems.
I urge that this proposal, i f it is made, be made in the
spirit which I advance it, not out of any desire to win another meaningless

- 28 victory in the propaganda war but in the spirit of peaceful political
competition, for the sake of Europe, for the sake of the world.
Let re suggest, finally, Mr. President, that beyond the
problem of the unity of the western nations, beyond the problem of
the unification of Germany, beyond the problem of instability in eastern
Europe, there still exists a need for a broad reconciliation between the
Western European countries and those of Eastern Europe.

There is a

need for a full resumption of cultural contact, trade and other
appropriate international intercourse.

That is an essential step

in the reduction of fears and the burden of armarents which .fears entail.
Perhaps the directions of this reconciliation can be ~
by a conference of the leaders of the European countries - East and
West - to undertake a general review of intra-European relations.

I

think it would be a good idea, too, if such a meeting is held, for the
<.?..

Soviet Union and the United States to sit at the back as observDrs
rather than in fDOnt, as the principal participants.
Mr. President, in concluding my remarks today, I remind the

Senate that I do not have access to all the facts which must go into
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policy.

The President and the Secretary of State preswmbly have those

facts.

In any event, they have responsibility for making the decisions.

It does seem to me, however, that if the world is to break out of the
dangerous impasse, if it is to move towards peace, then the path of
accommodation to the realities of the European situation must be fully
explored.

I believe there is at least a chance that we can move along

this path towards a more durable peace.

I believe we can do so without

relative loss of security for ourselves and with a positive gain for the
security of all nations.

What I am suggesting here, Mr. President,

are possible steps along this path away from the abyss of the ultimate
war.

I am suggesting that we consider these stepsJ not as a concession

to the Russians )but as an initiative for peace for the
Q.)JL

~

nation, Europe and ~nd.

"

oenefit of this

